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Abstract
Introduction: The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) is widely accepted as
a pragmatic characterisation of that human experience. Although the Notes that accompany it characterise pain as “always
subjective,” the IASP definition itself fails to sufficiently integrate phenomenological aspects of pain.
Methods: This essay reviews the historical development of the IASP definition, and the commentaries and suggestedmodifications
to it over almost 40 years. Common factors of pain experience identified in phenomenological studies are described, together with
theoretical insights from philosophy and biology.
Results: A fuller understanding of the pain experience and of the clinical care of those experiencing pain is achievable through greater
attention to the phenomenology of pain, the social “intersubjective space” in which pain occurs, and the limitations of language.
Conclusion: Based on these results, a revised definition of pain is offered: Pain is a mutually recognizable somatic experience that
reflects a person’s apprehension of threat to their bodily or existential integrity.
Keywords: Definition of pain
Associated Commentaries: Osborn M. Situating pain in a more helpful place. PAIN Reports 2018:e642.
Treede R-D. The IASP definition of pain: as valid in 2018 as in 1979, but in need of regularly updated footnotes. PAIN Reports 2018:
e643.
1. Introduction
What does it mean, to be “in pain”? Is it analogous to being
“in love” or “in debt”? Especially, as was pointed out in a cartoon
in The Advertiser in 1927 (Anxious Mother: “You don’t look well,
Johnny. Are you in pain?” Johnny: “No, mummy. The pain’s in
me.” The Advertiser, 1927; quoted in The Lancet, 30 June 2012),
any “pain” is actually within, rather than without, the individual.5
Although the common experience of pain after acute tissue
injury—“pain associated with acute nociception”—is probably
universal among sentient creatures, problems emerge when that
same terminology is applied to instances in which tissue damage
is not directly discernible, and the term is usedmetaphorically; for
example, “I feel as if there is a knife in my back” or, “my heart is
broken.”
When the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP)
was formed in 1975, it was faced with the challenge of
establishing definitions that needed simultaneously to accom-
modate the significant advances in the scientific basis of
nociception and pain and to be pragmatic for people experienc-
ing pain and their clinicians.
In this article, we explore again the question of whether pain
can be defined, examine the background to the formulation of
the IASP definition, and consider the various criticisms raised
and modifications suggested. Then, taking into account novel
perspectives, we propose a new definition of pain that closely
tracks that of the IASP but which, in contrast, is based on
common factors within the pain experience as derived from
psychophysical and phenomenological studies.
2. Can pain be defined?
In the preface to his book Pain, Lewis,22 a prominent researcher
of pain mechanisms, admitted that he was unable to satisfactorily
define pain, and that any attempt to do so “could serve no useful
purpose.”
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The British neurologist Holmes18 was another authority who
could not see the value of a definition: “In fact, a definition that
would at the same time be adequately inclusive and sufficiently
restricted is scarcely possible” (p. 18).
Indeed, any attempt to define pain is daunting due to 2
interdependent challenges that transcend different cultures. One
is the conceptual challenge of making sense of the mystery of the
experience of pain; the other is the linguistic challenge of how to
express that process accurately, when constrained by natural
language to approach it only indirectly.
In proposing a new theoretical framework for Pain Medicine,
Quintner et al.44 drew upon the philosophical concept of aporia.
From theGreekmeaning “lacking a path, a passage, or away,” an
aporia is a puzzle or an apparently insoluble impasse, encom-
passing the dual problems of not knowing how one has arrived at
a destination and not knowing where to go next.7 Pain may be
seen as such an aporia, a space to which it is difficult to gain
access but from which one cannot escape. However, aporia is
also used in rhetoric as a means of expressing doubt, a concept
which is relevant to this framework (Oxford English Dictionary).
Underpinning this difficulty in understanding and explaining the
experience of pain is the limitation of language. On the one hand,
the person experiencing pain has no direct language in which
either to express that experience to others or to explain it to
themselves and thus must resort to simile and metaphor, usually
creatively.47 On the other hand, clinicians tend to use the
language of biomedicine that implies “a predictable and linear
relationship between identifiable tissue damage and the report of
pain.”44
Although both clinician and patient follow different paths and
have differing agendas, including various beliefs and expect-
ations, they arrive at the same destination, which is the clinical
encounter. The person experiencing pain presents for investiga-
tion and treatment with the quite reasonable expectation that the
clinician will be able to explain their experience using currently
available medical scientific knowledge. However, when the
clinician does not know how to proceed, the result for both
parties can be a crisis of choice, action, and identity.
When confronted with their clinician’s dilemma, the person
experiencing pain is forced to share the very same set of doubt
and uncertainty, thereby compounding their own discomfort. This
has potentially negative implications for the therapeutic relation-
ship9 including physical and emotional harm, whereas within the
health care system and society at large, there is the very real risk
of the person being stigmatised, a narrative in which their
experience is declared invalid, imagined, or immoral.34
3. Defining pain
3.1. Current International Association for the Study of
Pain definition
In 1979, the IASP approved a definition of pain that not only
coupled the sensory and emotional dimensions of the experience,
but also recognised the association between tissue injury and pain:
“An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of
such damage.”19
This definition, which attempted to provide a universal character-
isation of the human experience of pain, was intended for use by
clinicians, although this was not made clear until 1986. However,
from its inception, it heralded a growing recognition that pain is
a subject worthy of study in its own right. It has been described as
concise, flexible, and accurate, and therefore clinically workable,32
and has gained wide acceptance as being authoritative,20 including
being adopted by the World Health Organisation (http://www.
health24.com/Medical/Pain-Management/About-pain/Definition-of-
pain-2012072).
The Note on Usage appended to the definition claims that
“each individual learns the application of the word through
experiences related to injury in early life.”31 Therefore, the word
“pain” does not simply denote a raw experience and the way it is
connoted, but also the way in which it is used. Each individual
learns when it is correct to think and speak of oneself as “I am in
pain,” and learning to communicate what is happening involves
understanding sentences about pain. Furthermore, that state-
ment conveys to another person in the same language group that
“I am in pain” is a mutually recognised experience.
3.2. Antecedents to the International Association for the
Study of Pain definition
Given the centrality of the current IASP definition of pain to clinical
practice and to the scientific and ethnological literature, it is
relevant to examine its origins.
Sternbach49 proposed that “pain” denotes “(1) a personal,
private sensation of hurt, (2) a harmful stimulus which signals
current or impending tissue damage, and (3) a pattern of
responses which operate to protect the organism from harm.”
This proposal conflated a stimulus (“harmful”), a sensation
(“hurt”), and a teleological function (“to protect the organism”).
Mountcastle33 proposed that pain was “that sensory experi-
ence evoked by stimuli that injure or threaten to destroy tissue,
defined introspectively by every man as that which hurts.” This
definition was essentially circular—“pain is that which
hurts”—and tied the experience to an alarming stimulus
(“threaten to destroy”).
Merskey30 also linked pain to tissue damage but, in contrast to
Sternbach and Mountcastle, he posited that the link between pain
and actual or potential tissue damage could either be demonstra-
ble or identifiable by association as: “An unpleasant experience
which we primarily associate with tissue damage or describe in
termsof suchdamage, or both.”Merskeywas the firstmodernpain
theorist to conceptualise pain as an experience. His definition
emphasised, “the relationship of pain with the experience of
damage to the body and, without making any assumption as to
causes, it provides a framework whereby the statements of
patients who describe bodily experiences like burning, aching,
stabbing, etc., can be assessed, investigated and compared.”
4. Criticisms of the International Association for the
Study of Pain definition
4.1. “Unpleasant” is an unsatisfactory descriptor
Many commentators, from Melzack and Wall29 to Olivier36 and
Williams and Craig,53 consider that the descriptor “unpleasant”
tends to trivialise the experience of pain.
The value of using diverse descriptors for the qualities of pain
experience is recognised in the McGill Pain Questionnaire
(MPQ).27,28 The 3 major classes of pain descriptors contained in
MPQ more closely align to the vocabulary used by contemporary
Anglophone pain sufferers than does “unpleasant” alone.25
The MPQ is based on the appreciation that pain is not a simple
“pure” sensation, varying only in its intensity (magnitude), but that
it also attracts both evaluative (eg, “sharp,” “pounding,”
“burning,” “aching,” “stabbing,” and “boring”) and affective (eg,
“frightful,” “sickening,” “cruel,” “agonizing,” and“torturing”)
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descriptions. The experience could be described also in terms of
other dimensions, such as spatial and temporal characteristics,
and on the variability in labels chosen to describe it.16 This
variability is partly interpersonal: self-report of pain provided in
clinical assessment integrates current pain experience together
with the perception as to how one should behave at the time in
relation to others, especially clinicians.
The complexity of responses to theMPQprovides critical insight
into the link between a patient’s report of pain and suffering due to
pain.16 It is clear that the descriptor “unpleasant” neither captures
the full range of words that could be used to describe the
experience nor conveys the level of suffering for some people.
4.2. Perpetuation of outdated thinking
The IASP definition asserts firstly that pain is not the same
phenomenon as nociception and secondly that it comprises
both sensory and emotional dimensions. However, this
apparent emancipation from body/mind dualism is signifi-
cantly qualified in the accompanying Note on Usage, “Many
people report pain in the absence of tissue damage or any
likely pathophysiological cause; usually this happens for
psychological reasons.”31 This risks perpetuating the errone-
ous belief that pain is either “real,” implying that it exists “in the
body,” or “imagined,” implying that it exists “in the mind.” That
the clinically untenable concept of “psychogenic pain” is still
extant reflects this enshrinement of a folk belief within the body
of a defining document.
4.3. No necessary association between an experience of pain
and tissue damage
Wright56 commented on the attempt by the IASP definition to
provide objective grounding for the experience by associating it
with “tissue damage.” However, the notes accompanying the
definition assert that pain is not necessarily tied to a stimulus
(“pain may be experienced in the apparent absence of a stimulus
and there may be activity in nociceptors in the absence of pain”).
This statement raises the possibility of misinterpretation by
clinicians who might confuse “association” with causation.56
The IASP’s approach to the definition (“described in terms of
such damage”) would not only establish the pain of acute
nociception as the reference standard for all other instances of
“pain” but also would imply that those other instances should
ultimately be reducible to “tissue damage.” A similar problem is
the use of questionnaires in which the descriptor words chosen
by the patient are said to be “diagnostic” of “neuropathic” pain.
Arguably, the link with tissue damage implies that a stimulus is
necessary, despite the rider in the Note on Usage to the
definition—“pain may be experienced in the apparent absence
of a stimulus and there may be activity in nociceptors in the
absence of pain”—and does not readily allow pain to be
experienced in the absence of evidence of nociception.31
4.4. Pain as a singular experience?
Smith et al. (2011) suggest that the IASP definition could imply
that the experience of pain is singular; that is, it ascribes
a common phenomenology (unpleasant sensory and emotional
experience) to all instances of pain. Clearly that is not the case, as
Melzack26 observed, “pain” represents “a category of experi-
ences, signifying a multitude of different unique events having
different causes, and characterised by different qualities along
a number of sensory and affective dimensions” (p. 46).
Price and Barrell43 proposed that the phenomenology of pain is
based on 3 factors (rather than Melzack’s category of experiences)
that are common to experiences thereof: (1) its unique sensory
qualities; (2) ameaningof intrusionor threat; and (3) related feelingsof
unpleasantness or other negative emotions. This formulation implies
that all 3 dimensions need to be clinically identified before the label
“pain” canbe applied to the experience,which ismore reminiscent of
diagnostic criteria for a syndrome or a disease than a definition.
4.5. Omission of important dimensions of the
pain experience
Williams and Craig53 noted that the IASP definition does not
include cognitive and social dimensions of the experience, which
they considered to be “essential qualities necessary to promote
good science and optimum health care.” However, an exposition
of the dimensions of an experience leading to beneficial care
delivery or particular outcomes is not required in its definition.
Morris32 anticipated this criticism by affirming that the IASP
definition “neither supports nor promotes social injustice.”
4.6. Self-report privileged
Anand andCraig1 complained that the definition depends on self-
report, thus potentially disenfranchising nonverbal groups such
as neonates, infants, and small children, people with intellectual
disabilities, degenerative brain disease, linguistic disorders, and
all nonhuman animals. Williams and Craig53 also considered that
verbal reports were being accorded a higher priority than
nonverbal behaviours.
In defence of the IASP definition, Aydede2 suggested that in
the clinical context, verbal reports are not necessary for detecting
if a person is experiencing pain and suggested that nonverbal
behaviours such as facial expressions would probably suffice.
Such behaviours have an important role in mediating pain
assessment in social contexts.
Observers prefer nonverbal to verbal behavior when interpret-
ing or judging the credibility of a person experiencing pain.38
Nevertheless, the question raised by Anand and Craig1 where
that person is unable to communicate with the observer has still
not been resolved.
4.7. Definition entrenches observer-dependency
Price41 remarked on the postulated association between
a sensation, an experience of unpleasantness, and actual or
potential tissue damage. He raised the important question as to
whether the basis for making such an association is dependent
on the “judgment of an outside observer or the experience of the
person in pain.”
An observer can never know with certainty whether the other
person is correct in making such an association. On the other
hand, through culturally and linguistically determined learning, the
sentient person experiencing pain will likely associate the
unpleasant sensation with either tissue damage or the appre-
hension thereof.
This “association” highlights the problem of observer de-
pendency and the tension between “privilege” accorded to self-
report and observer interpretation. Price’s41 criticism is therefore
valid only when there is discordance between the judgmentmade
by the observer and that of the person experiencing pain.
Scarry47 wrote: “To have pain is to have certainty; to hear about
pain is to have doubt.” The possibility of doubt underlines the
problem of discordance between the judgement of the observer
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and the pain experience of the other person, which raises the
clinical issue of the validation of pain, especially where careful
examination and extensive investigations have failed to reveal
a source of nociception.45 The question thus arises, how can an
observer know if a person is experiencing pain?
In the ordinary sense of the word “know”, observers can and
commonly do know that another person is experiencing pain. It is
misleading tomaintain that such knowledge can be only indirect: the
person experiencing pain does not doubt their “knowledge” of it,
whereas for observers there is no more direct way of knowing than
by observing the other’s language and behaviour. In such cases,
observers do not rely on inference that another is experiencing pain.
AsWittgenstein55 says, “Just try—in a real case—todoubt someone
else’s fear or pain.”Wittgenstein argues thatwecan say that “He is in
pain,” not becausewe have proof of the presence of pain, but simply
because in the process of being a fellow human being we cannot
doubt the reality of the other’s experience.37
Smith et al.48 claimed that the IASP definition does not exclude
“factitious pain” and “malingering,” which are said to be
“significant” clinical problems. These situations do not necessarily
exemplify that observer judgements of pain in others are
necessarily mistaken but rather that they are fallible.3 This fallibility
of observer judgements of the human experience of pain reflects
its complexity, unpredictability, and cultural relativity.
5. Proposals to modify the International Association
for the Study of Pain definition
In summary, criticisms of the IASP definition include the explicit
association of pain with tissue damage, perpetuation of dualistic
body–mind thinking and unresolved tension between the primacy
of self-report and the privileging of the perspective of the observer.
Aiming to distinguish pain from other unpleasant bodily
experiences (eg, nausea and fear), Fabrega and Tyma11
minimised its sensory-discriminative dimensions in favour of
boosting its affective-motivational properties and then relying on
the judgment of the individual as to whether the particular
perception is recognised as pain. In their formulation: Pain is an
unpleasant perception which the individual explicitly refers to his
body and which can represent a form of suffering. But this
definition would not distinguish between the pain of a person with
myocardial ischaemia and that of a person with a “broken heart.”
Olivier36 argued that, phenomenologically, pain is a mode of
bodily perception. Pursuing this argument, he stresses that the
experience of pain disturbs the ways in which we relate to our
environment: Pain is disturbed bodily perception bound to hurt,
affliction, or agony. However, this definition is ambiguous
because it could imply that someone watching another person
being tortured may experience pain directly as a result of the
observation. Furthermore, the terms “hurt,” “affliction,” and
“agony” require definition, whereas in this context it needs to be
clarified whether “bound to” means “tied to” or “destined to.”
Wright56 grounded the experience of pain in terms of its
(presumed) evolutionary role. By defining pain as a type of
unpleasant experience, he not only avoids linking that experience
to activation of nociceptors but also postulates a teleological
function for the experience: Pain is the (sic) unpleasant sensation
that has evolved to motivate behaviour, which avoids or
minimises tissue damage, or promotes recovery.
Along similar lines, Smith et al.48 advanced a definition of what
they called “canonical” (“normal, prototypical”) pain as an
unpleasant experience on the part of a human subject that is
both sensory and emotional and is of a type that is either
canonical pain or phenomenologically indistinguishable from
canonical pain. According to these authors, “canonical pain”
occurs in response to, and is concordant with, tissue damage
and is, in evolutionary terms, the most basic case of pain from
which all other pains were to be seen as variant phenomena. It is
unclear what is to count as “the most basic case of pain,” and
what “is concordant with tissue damage” means. Furthermore, it
is unclear how pain that is “phenomenologically indistinguishable
from canonical pain” is not in fact “canonical pain.”
Aydede2 reworded the definition to emphasise the relationship
between the typical phenomenology of pain and its canonical
causes: An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience that
results from actual or impending tissue damage, or is correctly
describable in terms of such damage. Apart from enshrining
tissue damage, this definition leaves unaddressed the normative
question of who determines the “correctness” of a person’s
description of pain, and how this is assessed.
Williams and Craig53 substituted “distressing” for “unpleasant”
and added “cognitive and social components” to the IASP
definition: Pain is a distressing experience associated with actual
or potential tissue damagewith sensory, emotional, cognitive and
social components. Adding components to the definition in this
way does not clarify the relationship between the stimulus (“tissue
damage”) and the experience.
However, these modified definitions are open to some of the
same criticisms as faced by the IASP definition. The definition of
Smith et al.48 seems to exclude cases of chronic pain unrelated to
pathology that are typically observed in specialist pain clinics.
Olivier36 and Wright’s56 definitions do not acknowledge the
multiple sensory, cognitive, and emotional dimensions common
to pain experience, or the commonmeaning of pain as immediate
intrusion or, attack on the body.
The introduction of technical terms from outside clinical
medicine such as “canonical pain” in the definition of Smith
et al.,48 or terms used not commonly associated with pain, such
as “affliction,” as in Wright’s56 definition may prove harder to
understand for clinicians than others who more closely track the
IASP definition. By being overly inclusive, the definitions of
Williams and Craig53 and the formulation of Price and Barrell43
sacrifice the parsimony that typifies the IASP definition.
6. Other concepts of pain that might inform
its definition
The question arises whether other concepts of pain might have
been overlooked in the process of definition. Pain has been
conceptualised in many differing ways by philosophers, poets,
experimental physiologists, as well as by physicians (reviewed by
Zimmermann57). In this section, we identify common concepts
and dimensions of pain, and the interrelationships among them.
6.1. Pain as a symptom with portent
Throughout its history, Western medicine has appreciated the
value of pain as a symptom of an underlying injury and disturbed
bodily function.35 The word “symptom” is derived from the Greek
expression sumtoma, meaning an occurrence or happening; but
sumtoma has as its stem the word sympiptein (to befall), which
carries with it an implied prediction or portent as to what might
befall that person. So, pain-as-a-symptom carries an implication
of a threatening reality.
But, chronic pain may occur in the absence of a discernible
disease process, thus deflecting pain from being a symptom to
being the harbinger of a daunting and at times a terrifying future,
for both clinician and patient.46
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6.2. Pain as a corporal experience
From ancient times, pain has been construed as a form of
punishment visited on humankind by supernatural forces (eg, evil
spirits) invading the person’s body, as a test of the person’s faith
that a divine being will protect them from bodily injury. Another
view saw pain as the result of an imbalance of the vital fluids.23 In
each example, pain is expressed through the body.
In modern times, psychophysical and phenomenological
studies have confirmed the core meaning of pain as a sense of
personal intrusion or attack on the body that is sometimes
accompanied by immediate and extended negative feelings of
anxiety, fear, annoyance, and depression.40,42
6.3. Pain as a source of meaning
Degenaar10 saw human beings experiencing pain as “more than
patients that require treatment,” but rather as “persons who are
threatened in their existence and are crying for help.” He viewed
therapy as caring for them “in terms of the destination of human life.”
6.4. Intersubjectivity
Our personal experiences are not simply private events but are
connected with other experiences to which publicly shared
concepts can be applied. Through culturally and linguistically
determined learning, a person learns when it is correct to think
and speak of oneself as “in pain,” and understanding what this
experience entails.55
The mere mention of pain immediately raises certain possibil-
ities: “What has caused the pain? Where do you feel the pain?
How long did it last? Is it sharp, burning, or stinging? Are you all
right?” Thus, the experience of pain is articulated in a web of
shared concepts through which others can respond to what is
happening to a person. This is not to deny objective aspects of
pain (as in the burgeoning knowledge base of neuroscience) nor
of course its inherent subjectivity.
Philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965) described 2 different
approaches through which people can choose to relate to their
environment: I-It or I-Thou.6 People can observe the sun or trees,
but they do not ask these objects to describe or to account for
what they think or feel (I-It). People ask this question only of one
object in the environment, namely that which people address as
“you.” “How are you?” is a form of words that establishes
a relationship that can exist only between those who refer to
themselves as I (ie, I-Thou). Thus, echoing Buber’s I-Thou
approach, it is by addressing each other as “you” that we secure
ourselves in the weave of intersubjective relations, and it is due to
our place in the weave that we are persons.17
British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott drew attention to the
“importance both in theory and practice of a third area, that of
play, which expands into creative living and into the whole cultural
life of man” (Ref. 54 [p.102]). He referred to this intermediate area
as a “potential” space, in which the phenomena of culture and
creativity will occur. As he observed during the imaginative play of
children, this intermediate area is one in which players agree to
mutually construct a relevant culture for a particular purpose.12
When the players are the person experiencing pain and the
clinician, they are simultaneously “…both observer and observed,
locked inextricably in a dance that defines the impossibility of
objectivity.”44 Following Winnicott, the virtual space where such
an encounter—the “dance”—might take place has been termed
the intersubjective (or “third”) space.44,45
This is a legitimate (socially sanctioned) and safe communal
space in which both parties can accept and negotiate the
meanings of the experience, including the testing of boundaries,4
thereby creating a therapeutic relationship.13 Through creative
expression, differences of point of view can be resolved and new
possibilities are allowed to emerge. Thus, the clinician–patient
relationship becomes a truly intersubjective one, when Buber’s I-
Thou dichotomy can be transcended as “We.”
6.5 Threat to existential integrity
As discussed above, the experience of pain is commonly
expressed in terms of threat to bodily integrity. “Integrity” means
the state of being whole, which when applied to living beings
is closely related to “autonomy” meaning existence as an
independent organism and not as a mere form or state of
development of an organism (Macquarie Australian Dictionary, 7th
ed. 2017). In a much broader context then, the concept of “threat
to bodily integrity” can be extended to a threat to a person’s very
existence, that is, a threat to their existential integrity.10 This raises
the important question of the necessary conditions for the survival
of living beings as integral, autonomous systems.
American physiologist Cannon8 postulated the existence of
a self-regulatory adaptive mechanism that allowed organisms to
maintain themselves in a state of dynamic balance in the face of
changing conditions. For this mechanism, he coined the term
homeostasis.
Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela24 took this concept
further by arguing that the unique property possessed by living
organisms is a particular circular mechanism of spontaneous
autonomous activity contained within a semipermeable bound-
ary, a process which they called autopoiesis, from the Greek,
meaning self-producing. They defined an “autopoietic unit” as
a homeostatic systemcapable of being self-sustaining by virtue of
an inner network of reactions (namely, its organization) that
regenerate all the system’s components (namely, its structure).
These components are ceaselessly regenerated and the system
always contains the very network that produces them.
The critical variable of a living system then is its self-
organization, which determines both the identity and general
configuration (structure) of the system. Its structure changes
constantly as the system continually adapts itself to perturbations
(unpredictable disturbances) in its environment. Loss of the
system’s organization results in its death. Vernon et al.52 refer to
these processes as ensuring “constitutive” autonomy, with the
focus being on the internal organisation that maintains living
systems as identifiable autonomous entities.
By contrast, Tabor et al.50 focus on the extent to which the
person’s behaviour reflects strategies to ensure survival in the
context of perceived threat. Vernon et al.52 refer to this external
process as maintaining or ensuring “behavioural autonomy.”
If preservation of autonomy is the critical variable of a living
system,52 then pain is a threat to that autonomy and thus to the
existential integrity of a living system.
7. Toward a new definition
To recapitulate the IASP definition of pain: “An unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.”
The major advances of this definition included its conceptu-
alisation as an “experience,” explicitly sensory and emotional,
asserting that pain is not a “thing” such as a disease, and the
linking of the experience with tissue damage. This latter
generated a new vocabulary, based on the Latin root “noci-”
meaning “harm,” synonymous with “damage.”
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The major problems with this definition of pain appear to be:
(1) that although pain is “always subjective,” objectivity is also
required, thus privileging the stance of the observer over that of
the experiencer.
(2) the compulsory linking of pain with “tissue damage” which,
although denied, again focuses attention on a problem of/in the
body, as distinct from a problem with the body.
(3) implied equivocation about its veracity as a form of distress
when there is no obvious nociception.
Thechallengesof redefinition thenare toembracepain asashared
phenomenon, privileging neither observer nor observed, to acknowl-
edge that it is an experience involving the body without necessarily
“blaming” the body, and to move from “damage” to threat.
Therefore, we propose: Pain is a mutually recognisable
somatic experience that reflects a person’s apprehension of
threat to their bodily or existential integrity.
The above discussion emphasises how difficult it is to grasp an
aporia. However, “pain” is clearly an experience only of a sentient
being, one that canbe recognisedbyothers in the samespecies. So,
we have characterised it as “mutually recognisable” to capture both
the aporia and inherent intersubjectivity of pain, which are integral to
a phenomenologically sound definition. Recognising mutuality in the
proposed definition removes the element of doubt and the at times
vexed and polarising issues of subjectivity and objectivity when
a clinician is attempting to evaluate a patient’s experience. The term
acknowledges the important pointmade in theNotes attached to the
IASP definition: “each individual learns the application of the word
through experiences related to injury in early life.”
This helps to resolve the clinician’s dilemma, enabling a clinical
encounter that ensures a mutual exploration of the patient’s beliefs,
expectations, emotions, and perceived meanings of pain.51 This
negotiated position stands to relieve the tension between the
competing “privileges” of self-report and observer interpretation.
The dissatisfaction with “unpleasant” as a defining adjective for
this experience is not resolved by adding reference to other
dimensions. Indeed, the need for an encompassing adjective
probably became redundant after the development of the MPQ.
By contrast, we would argue that a qualifier is not needed if the
experience is mutually recognisable and we question how does
one in any case qualify an aporia?
We have explicitly substituted “somatic” for “sensory and
emotional,” to locate the experience of pain in the body. People
experiencepain “in andof thebody,” not “in thebrain” or “in themind.”
It has been suggested that “embodied” is a more appropriate
conceptualisation of the relationship between the body and the
experience of pain.50 However, that term has been defined in
different ways: (1) as a concrete expression of some idea or
quality (Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th ed. 2010);
(2) as a position in cognitive science emphasising the role that the
body plays in shaping themind21; (3) the subject’s own view of his
or her body as it has to be lived with subjectively”39; or (4) as
emphasising “the pivotal role played by the lived body in the
constitution of the way we understand the world of others.”14
Embodiment has also been connoted to mean that the structure
and function of the body determines “parts of our conceptual system
and therefore some aspects of our language” (Ref. 15 [p. 36]). As we
understand it, this connotation from cognitive linguistics postulates
that because the brain is part of the body, then those brain-
dependent functionssuchasperceptionand reasoningare ipso facto
“embodied.” By this connotation, pain is self-evidently “embodied”
but that does not indicate where the person locates the experience,
which in our view is unequivocally in the soma (to includeboth parietal
and visceral components). In view of its multiple meanings, in our
opinion, “embodiment” does not belong in a definition of pain.
Pain is not the only “mutually recognisable” experience or the
only “mutually recognisable somatic experience” of sentient
beings. But, as has been argued, linking it to “tissue damage” is
problematic. Removal of “tissue damage” from the definition
overcomes the ambiguity present in the phrase “actual or
potential tissue damage” and may enfranchise those who are
experiencing pain but in whom there is no identifiable tissue
damage. Furthermore, it follows that, arising out of inferences
based on previous experience, the person “in pain” has already
distinguished that from other distressing mutually recognizable
states such as hunger, dyspnoea, or anxiety.
Nonetheless, any definition of this experience must acknowl-
edge its intrinsicmeaning, especially as culturally and linguistically
determined. It seems clear that the experience of pain is
threatening, but what is the nature of that threat? We suggest it
is to the person’s perceived ability to maintain their existential
integrity, as we have characterised it.
To convey this, the term “apprehension”—meaning anticipa-
tion of adversity, dread, or fear—is offered to capture the
underlying concept of “expressed in terms of actual or potential
tissue damage,” which can accommodate other meanings that
might be attributed by the person to their experience of pain.
7.1. Limitations of the proposed definition
The proposed definition does not include what have been argued
are the unique sensory qualities of pain that are like those that
occur during tissue damaging stimulation, or the negative feelings
of anxiety, fear, annoyance, and depression that commonly
accompany pain.41,43 These common factors have been reliably
observed in phenomenological and psychophysical research
since the early 20th century.43,51
Not everyone who experiences pain will wish to share that
experience with others, including health professionals, or agree
that their bodily and/or existential integrity are threatened. But,
not everyone who experiences pain presents as a patient seeking
assistance from those in the health professions. It is to the clinical
situation that the proposed definition is intended to apply.
8. Conclusion
Wehave argued that the IASP definition of pain, which is now in its
maturity, has ultimately not been conducive to a fuller un-
derstanding of the nature of this human experience. We propose
that pain be redefined as a mutually recognizable somatic
experience that reflects a person’s apprehension of threat to
their bodily or existential integrity. This definition integrates the
subjectivity or “first-person” level of experience of pain, and the
challenge for the “second-person” of clinical evaluation (if not also
intervention) towards objective “third-person” goals. This re-
definition of pain is compatible with the IASP definition but more
philosophically sound, biologically relevant, clinically applicable,
and meaningful for people experiencing pain and for health care
professionals who engage with them.
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